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This volume is a collection of seven papers delivered at a sympo-
sium assembled in April 1989 upon the occasion, almost two hundred
years hence, of the passage of the Bill of Rights by the First Congress.
The unifying theme is stated to be the historical context of both Reli-
gion Clauses in the First Amendment, but the authors are driven pri-
marily by Establishment Clause concerns. The thrust of the essays
deal harshly with the originalism advanced during the years of the
Reagan Administration, and nonpreferentialism comes in for particu-
lar criticism, both pejoratively characterized as that "growing
clamor" (viii).
The authors generally sympathize with the standing order since
Everson v Board of Education,I albeit the more scholarly among them
have the decency to be embarrassed by Justice Black's law-office his-
tory in that case. Despite the obligatory statement by the convening
editor that the essays "provoked lively discussions," (vii) the gather-
ing overall must have been a congenial affair. Nonetheless, there is
more disagreement than apparent on first reading, thus the book
wants for a concluding chapter marshalling the points of contention.
It is as if each paper is published in isolation of the others. Since the
essays manage not to join on the issues, it would be easy to miss the
points of contention that remain among these authors who, while
separationists, are various hues of that genre. It would seem that
there are three areas of inquiry that divide them.
First, was religious liberty primarily the achievement of dissent-
ing Christian sects (Baptists, Quakers and Anabaptists) motivated by
their belief that true religion was individualistic and voluntaristic, and
by their concern that the church, the very bride of Christ, remain
pure and uncorrupted by complicity with government? Or was liberty
the practical consequence of a religiously diverse and unchurched
America, where the absence of any one religion able to dominate inev-
itably drove each sect to grudgingly accede to no-establishment as the
best way to protect its own turf? Or was religious liberty won by
prominent republicans like Madison and Jefferson, principally influ-
enced by the rationalism of the Enlightenment with its vivid memory
1. 330 US 1 (1947).
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of European sectarian wars? One's choice among these options makes
religious liberty principally an article of faith, an article of political
expedience, or an article of peace.
Second, in addressing the intent of the founders concerning the
Religion Clauses, should one be examining the work of the First Con-
gress from June 8th to September 24th of 1789 as recorded in The
Annals of Congress? Or, is the question of original intent to be gov-
erned by the evolution of religious liberty in the newly formed states
beginning in 1776 as they threw off their colonial charters and drafted
new constitutions - an evolution that occurred rapidly and dramati-
cally in Virginia from 1783 to 1786, but ever so slowly in Puritan New
England with Massachusetts not disestablishing until 1833? The
Supreme Court has given this choice a most peculiar spin. The fed-
eral law of no-establishment was of little interest, of course, until the
Everson decision brought the full force of the Establishment Clause to
bear on state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In so doing, however, the Court read into the Establishment
Clause, not a federal rule of decision as inferred from the legislative
debates in the First Congress, but broad principles of religious liberty
as they evolved in the laws of the several states from 1776 to the
1830s.
Third, while the authors join in the belief that correct Establish-
ment Clause doctrine is not nonpreferentialist, just what is meant by
the phrase "respecting an establishment of religion"? Is no-establish-
ment achieved when there is mere absence of government-induced co-
ercion of religiously based conscience, i.e., official tolerance of dissent?
Or is no-establishment achieved only after there is entire separation of
church and state as to financial support? Or is it also a bar to the
endorsement of religion? Or also a bar to religion having a role in
shaping government policy?
In the Introduction, James E. Wood, Jr., Professor of Church-
State Studies at Baylor University, focuses principally on the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1787 which gave scarce consideration to the
matter of religious liberty, indeed a plenary treatment of enumerated
rights was briefly considered and rejected. Instead, the drafters relied
on the delegation of limited powers to the proposed central govern-
ment, finding no need to deny powers not expressly granted. Con-
cerning the means whereby religious liberty was ultimately achieved,
a "primary reason" (10), says Wood, was religious diversity and that
a vast majority of Americans were members of no church. Each sect,
argues Wood, wanting to protect its own interests from government
[Vol. 8
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intrusion, was forced to accept a notion of religious freedom for
others that they wanted for themselves. No mention is made of the
debates in the First Congress over the text of the First Amendment.
Rather, like the Court in Everson, Wood relies on a selective recita-
tion of evolving concepts of religious liberty in the original states (7-
10).
David Little, Professor of Religious Studies at the University of
Virginia at Charlottesville, argues that a prime mover in the achieve-
ment of religious liberty was religion itself, or, more precisely, "the
radical Reformed tradition" (38) (elsewhere termed "left-wing Puri-
tans"). In so doing, Little seeks to rehabilitate the role played in that
accomplishment by the seventeenth-century preacher, essayist, and
founder of Rhode Island, Roger Williams. Little ties the ideas of Wil-
liams to John Locke's letters on toleration and the sanctity of con-
science, and from Locke to James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. It
is unclear why such a heavy investment is made in drawing this con-
nection spanning one and a half centuries, when eighteenth-century
religionists, such as Isaac Backus, are prominent at the first moment
of nationhood. What is important, however, is that unlike others who
place pragmatic considerations foremost, Little directly links the
achievement of church-state separation to the Christian gospel under-
stood in the free church tradition. In opposition to Father John
Courtney Murray and historian Quentin Skinner, Little reads the Es-
tablishment Clause to indeed reflect principles of Protestant faith (17-
18, 20, 37-39).
Edwin S. Gaustad, Professor of History at the University of Cali-
fornia at Riverside, addresses the perceived deficiencies in the original
Constitution that caused anxieties over religion, especially during the
ratification period. His efforts arrive at three conclusions (56), offered
as part of the milieu from which the First Amendment was soon to be
hammered out in the First Congress. First, that in 1787 freedom for
religious dissenters from direct government coercion was no longer an
issue. Second, official affirmations of religion in foundational docu-
ments, either unabashedly Christian or ceremonial deism, were con-
troversial. The Constitution is noticeably silent on this score, unlike
the state constitutions adopted during the period. This issue, while
still not laid to rest even a century later, was resolved in favor of
continued silence. Gaustad attributes this settlement to a blend of the
desire to avoid sectarian divisiveness that might get in the way of
forming the union, and, in a few circles, anti-clericalism (43). Third,
while direct federal financial aid to religion was defeated (over dis-
651]
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sent), even of a nonpreferential sort, government affirmations favoring
the Christian faith, of the nonsectarian sort, were considered and
(over dissent) deemed. necessary for moral training and good
government.
Henry J..Abraham, Professor of Government and Foreign Af-
fairs at the University of Virginia at Charlottesville, revisits the site of
an old battle-of-historians: Did the Thirty-ninth Congress intend the
Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the Bill of Rights thus making
its provisions binding on the states? Abraham does not resift the rub-
ble. Rather, referencing the important scholarship for and against
Justice Black's novation, Abraham erects an 'at-a-boy memorial hon-
oring the Supreme Court's case-by-case process know as selective in-
corporation. However, this process has long since run its course, the
last incorporation case being handed down in 1969. And so far as
current cases before the Court, the wisdom of the application of the
Religion Clauses to the states is a dead issue in any circle that mat-
ters.2 So it is not apparent how this paper furthers our understanding
of the First Amendment. An opportunity is missed when Abraham
fails to examine the textual use of the very peculiar word choice of
"respecting," in "no law respecting an establishment of religion."
. In particular, it would have been highly pertinent to have ex-
amined incorporation in light of the view of Mark DeWolf Howe (and
others) .that the Establishment Clause is not a "liberty" within the
meaning of the due process clause properly incorporated as a funda-
mental right, but a federalism provision meant to bar Congress from
disturbing the church establishments of 1787 and other common reli-
gious preferences in the states.3 Abraham's overall celebration of se-
lective incorporation impliedly rejects Malbin and Howe, but the
essay wants for an explanation from either text or history.
Douglas Laycock, Professor of Law at the University of Texas at
Austin, most helpfully distinguishes between two arguments over
original intent: What did the framers intend? (an argument about his-
tory); and, What is the proper role of the framer's intent in adjudica-
tion? (an argument over the Court's theory of constitutional
interpretation). As to the former question, Laycock claims that little
can be gleaned from the debates in the First Congress, falling back, as
he does, on the social, intellectual and political history of the founding
2. See Jaffree v Bd of School Comm 'rs of Mobile County, 554 F Supp 1104,1128 (SD Ala
1983), rev'd sub nom Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38, 48-56 (1985).
3. Mark Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in Constitu-
tional History (Chicago, 1965).
[Vol. 8
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generation (90). However, he later uses the series of drafts of the First
Amendment ultimately rejected (i.e., proposed text as distinct from
debate) to repudiate nonpreferentialism (98-103). Concerning the lat-
ter question, Laycock usefully spars with Steven D. Smith's recent
article.4 Their disagreement, says Laycock, is not over history, but
over the proper theory of judicial review concerning the text of the
Establishment Clause (104). Smith reads the text to allow nonfinan-
cial support of religion because the founders frequently engaged in
such endorsements without apparent concern that they might be vio-
lating the First Amendment. Laycock reads into the Establishment
Clause broader principles drawn from actual controversies in which
the founders were engaged, principles that prohibit such official ex-
pressions of Christian piety. The one-year hiatus between the confer-
ence and the publishing of the papers permits Laycock to tack on a
codicil to his essay, otherwise given over to no-establishment, to re-
monstrate against the Supreme Court's downgrading of the Free Ex-
ercise clause in Employment Division v Smith. '
John F. Wilson, Professor of Religion at Princeton University,
laments the confusion of jurists and historians of law, on the one
hand, with the discipline of the "critical historian" (119). The latter's
task, in which category Wilson places himself, is to construe the evi-
dence in the broadest possible framework, as distinct from the "termi-
nus inquiry" of using the evidence to give meaning to a brief text in a
document of juridical import. Wilson justifies this "elaborate argu-
ment" (130), not because he has grown weary of abuses of history and
the "mythic or veiled form jurists and historians of law pursue" (129).
Indeed, Wilson refrains from arguing that this "jurisprudential rea-
soning should change" (130), or that the Supreme Court has gotten
matters either right or wrong. But as a critical historian, he refuses to
slide over extrapolations such as the excessive reliance on the Virginia
experience as exemplary of "the correct framework in which the text
of the First Amendment should be situated" (126). And Wilson im-
plies that scholars such as Howe were closer to the critical historians'
"broadest possible framework" in stating that originally the Estab-
lishment Clause embodied "principles of federalism" (128) and an
anxiousness to "preserve the authority of the states over religion"
(129).
Leo Pfeffer, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Long Island
4. Stephen D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular". Reconstructing the Disestablishment
Doctrine, 67 Texas L Rev 955 (1989).
5. 110 S Ct 1595 (1990).
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University, and a well-known advocate in church-state matters, be-
gins his essay by careening through history violating the scholastic
principles painstakingly laid down by Wilson and Laycock. Pfeffer
picks and chooses events that help his cause and ignores evidence to
the contrary (133-136, 161). He then takes up the theme that the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause are "two ways of saying the same
thing" (133), and thus are never to be read in tension or opposition to
one another. However, Pfeffer strains to find scholar or jurist who
seriously disagrees with the unity theses. Indeed, he reviews case after
case where the Court has refused to place the clauses in contradiction.
Rather, the real debate is over the proper organizing principle under-
lying the two clauses. It does not advance the argument to say that
the unifying principle is "religious liberty," for that phrase is defined
in myriad of ways by the many protagonists. Here, as elsewhere, Pfef-
fer's perspective on no-establishment is governed by his near-religious
devotion to strict separationism (161).
As is often true of separationists' publications, the volume's ener-
gies are directed entirely towards preventing government aid to reli-
gious enterprises. Neglected is the manner in which the First
Amendment protects religious organizations from government intru-
sion into their ministries, or how the Amendment guarantees to reli-
gionists equal rights of speech and political activism aimed at
influencing government policy. The authors' vigorous repudiation of
nonpreferentialism is a timely contribution to the literature. Unfortu-
nately, in my opinion, the Supreme Court may be on the verge of
construing the Establishment Clause as embracing nonpreferential-
ism, for the Chief Justice and Justices White, Scalia and Kennedy
have all recently written or joined opinions to that effect. If that
should come to pass, the Court would have the dubious distinction of
jettisoning strict separationism backed by the one-sided history in Ev-
erson and replacing it with nonpreferentialism backed by the one-
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